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Making Soft Power Work:  
Theory and Practice in Australia’s International Education Policy 
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London School of Economics 
 
Policy makers around the world are increasingly concerned with the challenge of cultivating and 
capitalising on soft power. Yet government efforts to increase others’ feelings of attraction 
toward their countries face conceptual and practical challenges. This article examines 
Australia’s attempt to operationalize soft power in Asia through its international education 
strategy. Drawing on interviews with key officials, we show how the design of Australia’s 
international education policy was consciously informed by multiple dimensions of soft power. 
Yet the nature of soft power means that whether the policy will achieve its soft power objectives 
is up to Asia, not Australia.  
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Soft power has become something of a fascination with foreign policy makers around the world. 
Initially coined in critique of Paul Kennedy’s (1987) materialist decline thesis, Joseph Nye 
(1990) emphasized the vast reserves of nonmaterial attraction that would enable the United 
States to continue to lead even as its hard power declined. As economic interdependence has 
grown and the perceived utility of coercive instruments declined since the end of the Cold War, 
policy makers have increasingly looked to soft power as a route to securing national interests—
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the concept itself proving as seductive as the phenomenon it describes.  
 Yet operationalizing theoretical concepts as public policy—making soft power work—is 
challenging (Nye 2007, 171-2). Since soft power is a relational form of power and operates 
indirectly—through what others find attractive rather than through negotiation of specific 
demands—the potential sources of soft power are almost limitless, and their influence difficult to 
determine, particularly in advance of the fact. Critics point out that claims of soft power tend to 
be associated with the possession of hard power capabilities, and that the “attraction” on which it 
relies may be underpinned by coercive phenomena (Mattern 2005). Moreover, the policy 
mechanisms by which states might change others’ preferences—to get others to want what you 
want, as opposed to their already wanting what you want—are unclear. Indeed, such has been the 
proliferation of possibilities for soft power that some scholars view the concept as more a 
“category of practice” than a “category of analysis,” one that is intuitively useful in policy 
debates but which collapses under more experience-distant analysis (Hall 2010). 
 Such conceptual difficulties have not dimmed policy makers’ enthusiasm for capitalizing 
on soft power. In the West, democratic triumphalism in the 1990s led soft power to be initially 
operationalized through democracy promotion policies. Increasing the scope for soft power as 
foreign policy has widened, it now includes diaspora communities, public diplomacy, cultural 
programming, disaster relief, media, sport, and even the military. Different actors have 
conceptualized soft power in different ways: from the European Union’s (EU) embrace of 
“civilian power” as a means to superpower status, to Nye’s own politically-driven synthesis—
“smart power” (Armitage and Nye 2007).  
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 Perhaps the country where the term has attracted most interest at a strategic level is China 
(Minjiang 2008; Shambaugh 2015), with Chinese academics prominent in research interrogating 
the application of the concept (Wang 2008; Nye and Jisi 2010). The rationale is twofold—to 
ensure that China’s “peaceful rise” is perceived as such; and to benefit from the real economic 
gains concomitant with positive perceptions (Rose 2016). A clear example of this strategy is 
sport, with the Beijing Olympics in 2008 a triumph of sustained investment in Chinese sporting 
success.1 Most recently, football—that most international of sports, but one in which China has 
little history—is the object of ambitious government plans to build an $850bn sporting economy 
through massive investment in the Chinese Super League, which underpins a 15-year aim of 
hosting and winning the World Cup (Chadderton and Chapman 2016). Using sport to present a 
positive national image has led a number of rising powers to prioritize hosting major 
international sporting events as part of an explicit soft power strategy (Grix and Lee 2013). 
 Indeed, such has been the willingness of emerging nondemocracies to embrace the 
language and modes of soft power that some Western scholars regard the concept as having been 
“hijacked” (Walker 2016). Such academic concerns from liberal institutionalists are reflected in 
more politically immediate concerns that Western powers may be losing their soft power 
advantage. In 2014, the United Kingdom’s Parliament established a dedicated Select Committee 
on Soft Power and the United Kingdom’s Influence, which based its rationale explicitly on the 
need to maintain the United Kingdom’s standing in the face of the “rise of the rest.” Yet such 
political activism risks backfiring: one academic witness warned of the danger that explicitly 
                                                 
1 China tripled its number of Summer Olympic golds from 1996 to 2008, when it topped the medal table 
at its home Olympics. 
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seeking soft power might undermine its potential benefits, and concluded that “the more distance 
the better between the government and a nation's soft power capacity” (UK House of Lords 
2014). 
 This is a major dilemma confronting policy makers eager to cultivate and wield soft 
power but finding the tools of government rather blunt. It is the subject of soft power that 
determines its possession: in short, I get to decide whether I find you attractive or not. In large 
part, that attraction is out of your hands—behavior designed to curry favor is likely to be met 
with ambivalence at best; or worse, disdain.  
If soft power is more about who you are than what you do, agents face particular 
challenges in operationalizing it. And analysis of soft power that focuses on the agent cannot tell 
us that soft power works: it can only explicate the strategies by which agents seek to make it 
work. This article examines Australia’s attempt to operationalize soft power through its 
international education strategy. It seeks to identify how soft power considerations have 
informed the attendant policies and how surrounding governance arrangements can reinforce or 
undermine the operationalization of soft power. The article proceeds by first considering the 
theoretical challenges implied by attempts to operationalize soft power through policy making. It 
then briefly considers international education as a site of soft power, before discussing the 
Australian case. Drawing on interviews with key officials, we find that the design of Australia’s 
international education policy was driven by core soft power considerations around relationship 
building, as well as multiple dimensions of attraction. This is a new departure for Australia: 
although previous policies have had clearly identified soft power benefits, those had not been the 
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explicit intent of policy. Today Australia believes it can extract those benefits through policy 
design, and is explicitly prioritizing soft power in international education. This article examines 
how Australian policy makers have sought to operationalize soft power in international education 
policy, and highlights the practical and conceptual challenges they face in making soft power 
work. 
Making Hard Policy for Soft Power 
 Whilst Nye’s nomenclature of “soft power”—and the idea’s popularity among 
contemporary policy makers—is relatively new, the fundamentals are found in the classics of 
international relations. Classical writers such as Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) and Thucydides (460-
395 BC), as well as modern classical realists including Morgenthau (1904-1980) and Carr (1892-
1982), exhibit a richness to their conceptions of power that embrace both material and ideational, 
and coercive and attractive, elements.  
 Nye’s (2011, 19) definition points to the possibility of making policy for soft power by 
identifying soft power with a particular ability “to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by 
the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction.” While the use of 
“ability” may suggest the existence of specific soft power capabilities, Nye’s approach is more in 
keeping with a relational approach to power (Frey 1971) that treats power as the “capacity” to 
make or to receive any change, or to resist it, within a particular agent-subject relationship 
(Lukes 2007, 84). This is the essence of Robert Dahl’s definition of power—deliberately 
imitated by Nye—that power is the ability of A to get B to do what B would otherwise not want 
to do (Dahl 1957).  
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 A key difficulty in such relational approaches to power is that they equate power with 
success, and in so doing collapse the space within which strategy takes place. To devise policy 
options, we need to understand what influences how an “agent” state relates to a “subject” state. 
Nye (2006, 2004) provides a continuum of agent state power resources that equate uni-
directionally to a continuum of subject state behaviors. He argues that material “sticks,” such as 
military force or economic sanctions are used to command; material “carrots,” such as bribes, 
payments, and rewards are used to coerce and induce; and “preference shapers,” including 
culture, are used to co-opt and attract.  
 Such an approach may be practically useful for policy makers, but it neglects the 
intersubjectivity inherent within power relationships. If we admit that what the subject finds 
attractive is dependent on their context and sense of what is valuable, Nye’s one-way 
explanations suddenly become more complex. This is the crux of Lukes’ (2007, 87-92) critique: 
that Nye’s approach fails to distinguish between modes of persuasion and ways of shaping 
preferences. Whilst nonmaterial capabilities may play a role in the first and second faces of 
power—those of decision making and agenda setting—soft power is concerned with Lukes’ third 
face, where forces of attraction precipitate the voluntary alteration of preferences (Lukes 2005).  
 On this point there is, at best, weak theoretical literature explaining what happens 
between agents and subjects, or resources and the behaviors generated (Vuving 2009). This is a 
“deficiency in the international relations literature in the operationalization of the concept of soft 
power” (Wojciuk, Michalek, and Stormowska 2015, 300). As the academic co-chair of the 
Australia 2020 Summit’s Security and Prosperity working group put it, “I don’t think anyone 
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from Joseph Nye down has yet really captured exactly what it is that countries want to achieve 
through soft power, and how they can go about achieving it.2 
 One potential way to structure the intersubjectivity inherent in soft power is to think in 
terms of “power currencies.” Alexander Vuving (2009) proposes three different power currencies 
that take the form of the portrayal of particular traits of “brilliance,” “beauty,” and “benignity.” 
 “Brilliance” relates to high performance and perceived achievement by others. It works 
on the tendency of human beings to learn from the successes of others, considering that if one is 
more capable than them or than most, learning from them can be both effective and safer. This 
success may relate to a country’s practices, industries, policies, institutions, values, or vision 
(Vuving 2009, 10-11). Brilliance generates soft power through the production of admiration, 
which can lead to imitation or emulation and respect or fear or reverence (Vuving 2009, 8).  
 “Beauty” relates to the resonance that is evoked between actors who share ideals, values, 
or visions. It can give actors a sense of warmth, familiarity, self-extension, identity, and 
community (Vuving 2009, 9). “Beauty can come from a country that acts as the agent of a value, 
a country that is perceived as the avatar of an ideal, or a country that articulates a vision 
compellingly. It can then gain credibility, legitimacy and even moral authority as a representative 
and guardian of the cause” (Vuving 2009, 11). Beauty generates soft power through the 
production of inspiration.  
 “Benignity” works on the tendency of reciprocal altruism (Axelrod and Dion 1998) 
where feelings of obligation to reciprocate or acquiesce are generated through acts of kindness. 
                                                 
2 Professor Michael Wesley, Australia National University, interviewed by the authors on July 26, 2016. 
 
 
Australia’s International Education Policy 
 8 
Many behaviors are considered benign—from not doing harm to others to more selfless behavior 
actively supporting others or putting their interests ahead of your own. Benignity generates soft 
power through the production of gratitude and sympathy (Vuving 2009, 8). It can also reassure 
others of an agent’s peaceful or benevolent intentions, thereby inviting cooperation (Vuving 
2009, 9).  
 The three frames of “brilliance,” “beauty,” and “benignity” are not mutually exclusive: 
elements of policy—not to mention subject responses—may overlap, reinforce, or cut against 
each other. However, as a device to evaluate how agents go about operationalizing soft power, 
they provide a basic typology that can be used to structure a comprehensive analysis. 
International Education as Soft Power 
 International education has long been recognized as a potential source and expression of 
a state’s soft power. The United States promoted student exchange programs and scholarships 
specifically in order to foster Western elite unity during the Cold War, and universities have been 
sites of intercultural interaction and diplomatic influence since the Enlightenment, but 
particularly since their proliferation in the first half of the 20th century. That international 
education has a soft power impact is presumed and reflected across econometric rankings, and 
has even played a prominent role in the debate surrounding American decline (Cox 2012). 
 In contemporary terms, “international education” comprises all the ways that academic 
systems, institutions, and individuals are responding to an increasingly globalized world 
(Altbach and Knight 2007). Its key features are student mobility, academic mobility, and 
institutional mobility (Garam 2012, 16). Nye (2004) argues that “international education” is a 
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soft power resource under the category of “culture.” In this understanding, educational 
institutions are vehicles to showcase cultural forms.  
 Others have separated education from culture as a soft power category in its own right, 
Cowan and Arsenault (2008, 10) going so far as to argue “the provision of educational 
opportunities for foreign students is one of the most important instruments of soft power of the 
state.” This reflects international education’s relatively significant weighting in various measures 
of soft power (McClory 2016). Foreign graduates tend to become highly qualified personnel in 
their own countries, as a so-called “Trojan horse” (Tremblay 2010, 117), where the original 
educational exchange generates reputational gains that accrue to a host country when foreign 
students return home (Atkinson 2010) and advocate on behalf of their host country of study—a 
positive indirect “ripple effect” (Olberding and Olberding 2010). In research that supports the 
significance of this mechanism, Amirbek and Ydyrys (2014, 502) found that unfolding political 
events demonstrated that political leaders show sympathy and favor to the countries where they 
studied. Miller (2006) makes the simple, yet powerful point that the ability of a country to attract 
foreign students, or facilitate exchanges, is a powerful tool of public diplomacy in and of itself, 
even between countries with a history of animosity. 
 The soft power potential of international education is keenly appreciated by policy 
makers internationally. The United Kingdom, which has a higher education sector that ranks 
second only to the United States, has long appreciated the soft power benefits of scholarship 
schemes such as the Chevening, Marshall, and Commonwealth scholarships (UK BIS 2013). The 
driving idea behind such programs is to “expose students to British values, culture and diversity” 
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which can “build a strong, international network of friends of the UK who will rise to 
increasingly influential positions over the years” (UK House of Lords 2014, para 207). The UK’s 
hope is that playing a leading role in the education of the next generation of international 
leaders—particularly those from rising powers—will help maintain its legitimacy as a great 
power actor even as its relative hard power strength declines.  
 As the preeminent emerging power, China’s commitment to a “peaceful rise” has driven 
a sustained interest in soft power in both academic and policy circles (Mingjiang 2008). The 
signature initiative of China’s soft power approach in international education has been the 
establishment, funding, and staffing of hundreds of Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius 
Classrooms around the world. Linked directly to universities and schools, they provide language 
and cultural education (Paradise 2009; Yang 2010). Yet China’s approach—characterized by one 
American think tank as “soft power with Chinese characteristics” (Glaser and Murphy 2009)—is 
directive: reports of tight, top-down government control over research and teaching at CIs has 
generated suspicion among partners that these institutions are for propaganda purposes, rather 
than genuine learning experiences (Yang 2010, 237-38). The extent to which such perceptions 
are widespread highlights the difficulty for governments in directing policy and resources in 
pursuit of soft power ends.  
 Yet operationalizing soft power requires that states do exactly that: commit resources in 
ways directed by policy to activate core considerations of the concept (i.e., relationship-building; 
attraction; brilliance, beauty, and benignity). The remainder of this article considers Australia’s 
approach, to assess how policy makers approach the challenge of generating soft power through 
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international education policy. 
 
Australia’s International Education Strategy 
I remind the 2016 scholars here tonight that your scholarship is only the first part of your journey, 
for I hope you will maintain and nurture your connections, friendships you make and links in the 
Indo-Pacific region, including through the alumni program. New Colombo Plan scholars carry 
great personal dreams and ambition for their future careers. I do not want to lay upon your 
shoulders too heavy a burden, but you also carry the hopes and ambitions of our nation. (Bishop 
2016) 
 
 Australia’s Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, laid out the soft power component of the New 
Colombo Plan in stark terms: the “hopes and ambitions of our nation” relied on the “connections, 
friendships and links” that the Colombo scholars would make. Most crucially, they would build 
those people-to-people relationships “in” the Indo-Pacific region. 3  The significance of 
Australians going to the Indo-Pacific is reinforced by the reference to the “Colombo Plan.” 
Remembered fondly as a demonstration of Australia’s willingness to share its know-how with 
newly independent states (Oakman 2004), the reversal of student flows within the New Colombo 
Plan suggests quite different assumptions about how Australia can best build relationships and 
operationalize soft power in its region. 
 On 30 April 2016, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs joined Australia's first ever 
Minister for International Education to launch a suite of national strategies underpinning 
                                                 
3 The 2013 Liberal Government reintroduced this geographic reference to describe the region of critical 
national interest. It covers 38 countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cambodia, 
China, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, 
Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. 
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Australia's international education sector to 2025. Australia’s international education policy has 
four elements. One of these is the New Colombo Plan, launched in 2015. According to Peter 
Varghese, Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Secretary at the time and among 
the senior officials of most influence on the new international education policy, “[w]hat the 
policy does is that it says that Australia's relationship with the Indo-Pacific region is not only of 
the mind, it’s also of the heart.”4 
 By many measures, Australia “punches above its weight” in international education. 
Accounting for just 0.3 percent of the world’s population, Australia attracts more than 6 percent 
of all international students—the third highest share globally (OECD 2015, 356)—and has 
between six and eight of the world’s “top 100 universities,” depending on the ranking 
methodology (Universities Australia 2016). It has been heralded as a “super-growth” sector 
(Deloitte 2013) and in 2014, the international education industry overtook natural gas to become 
Australia's third largest export. By 2015, it had become the biggest services export earner, 
contributing over $AUD19.7 billion to Australia's GDP in 2014-15 (Deloitte 2016, 1). 
 International students—inbound, outbound, and borderless 5 —represent the most 
significant component of international education and generally the activity of most interest to 
governments. International students are reported to have studied in Australia as early as 1904 
(Goldring 1984, 29), but it was not until the 1950s under the Colombo Plan for Co-operative 
                                                 
4 Peter Varghese, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade until July 2016, interviewed by the 
authors on August 15, 2016. 
5 “Borderless” students are those receiving an education service from another country by means other 
than travelling to that country or attending a physical “offshore campus” of an overseas institution in their 
home country. Typically, the mode of delivery is online. 
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Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia program (the “Colombo Plan”) that 
international student numbers became significant. Over the life of the program, Australia 
provided 20,000 scholarships to Asians to study in Australian higher education institutions 
(Lowe 2002; Oakman 2004). As is shown in Figure 1, over the last 25 years alone, international 
student numbers have risen almost 3,000 percent, from 21,118 in 1990 to 645,185 in 2015—the 
largest enrolment of international students in Australia’s history (AG DET 2016b, 3). Students 
studying higher education make up the largest share, accounting for more than one in every five 
higher education students in Australia (OECD 2015, 352). International students studying for 
Vocational Education and Training (VET) qualifications and those studying English Language 
Intensive Courses for Overseas Students (ELICOS) also make up a sizeable and growing portion. 
 
Figure 1: International Student Growth in Australia, 1960-2015 (AG DET 2016b, 16)6 
                                                 
6  International students counted here are those: on a student visa and studying in Australia at a 
Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS) registered provider 
in higher education, VET, or ELICOS) institutions; on tourist or working holiday maker visas and 
studying ELICOS in the same period; aged 16 years or over, in years 11 and 12, studying in CRICOS-
registered Australian secondary schools with more than five international student enrolments. 
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 While often cited as Australia’s first major international education initiative, the 
Colombo Plan was, in fact, a Commonwealth aid program supporting the development of newly 
independent Commonwealth colonies. Today, officials responsible for delivering the new plan 
are keenly aware of that legacy and its importance. 
If you look back in time, we had the Colombo Plan, which was a Commonwealth initiative but 
Australia talks about it in fonder terms than just about anybody else. It was hugely significant as a 
foreign policy measure and as a catalyst for international students in Australia helping to break 
down misperceptions of what our place in the world was.7  
 
 It is clear from the perspective of today that the ‘old’ Colombo Plan was more than an 
                                                 
7  Robert Tranter, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Communications, and Scholarships 
Division, DFAT, interviewed by the authors July 5, 2016. 
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education initiative and more than an aid initiative. For Percy Spender, an architect of the Plan 
and Australia's External Affairs Minister (1949-51), the Colombo Plan was about influencing 
and stabilizing regional geopolitics through attracting allies and shaping their ideological 
preferences. It was, at its heart, a policy designed to mitigate decolonization and sustain ties 
between the imperial core and among the states of the former periphery, but its focus on elite-
elite connections does not suggest an understanding of soft power in the way we tend to think 
about the concept today. Its particular implementation in the Australian case had more direct and 
particular geopolitical purposes in the context of communism’s spread in South and Southeast 
Asia (Lowe 2002, 186, 190-1). Richard Casey, Spender’s successor, saw the Colombo Plan as 
fulfilling Australia’s “need to understand and be understood” by Asia, believing that students’ 
exposure to Australia “at an impressionable stage of their lives… should do a great deal to break 
down prejudices and misunderstandings on both sides” (Oakman 2002). Those with whom 
Australia sought geopolitical influence were to be cultivated through direct exposure to 
institutions, values, politics, and people. However, if the Colombo Plan was a deliberate attempt 
to operationalize principles of soft power with international education policy as the vehicle, it 
was somewhat narrow in its singular focus on elites, and on showcasing Australia—the 
“brilliance” dimension. As David Lowe (2002, 196) writes: 
There was a solid, if somewhat woolly, logic to training Asian elites in Australia who would then 
return to their countries, hopefully with no antagonism towards the white continent, and with a 
strong sense that the development of their own countries would benefit from continuing 
collaboration with countries such as Australia. 
 
Australia’s New International Education Policy 
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The soft power logic of the original Colombo Plan didn’t last. The program had been 
wound up by the early 1980s, and the imposition of an Overseas Student Charge was 
representative of a broader shift in Australia’s international education policy—from aid to 
trade—taking place. By the end of the decade, policy makers were talking about “educational 
services exports” and the baton had been passed from DFAT to the Department of Trade 
(Meadows 2011, 60-8). Yet, by the 2000s, the rapidly expanded industry was receiving attention 
for all the wrong reasons, with a series of scandals affecting international students. For the 
Liberal Party, then in Opposition, the Colombo Plan’s positive legacy under previous Liberal 
Governments provided the blueprint for rehabilitating Australia’s international education 
policy—but half a century of scholarship on the third face of power and policy experimentation 
provided for a more comprehensive and potentially sophisticated approach. If the “Old” 
Colombo Plan hoped that international education would precipitate geopolitical benefits, 
Australian policy makers at the turn of the 21st century believed that they could design policies 
that would have soft power effects. Their proposal—the New Colombo Plan (NCP)—was a 
manifesto commitment in 2013 and is a “signature initiative” of the Liberal Government (Liberal 
Party 2013). It reverses the direction of travel of its predecessor by sending Australians to Asia: 
sponsoring study and internships in a choice of 38 countries spanning the Indo-Pacific region. 
$AUD100 million has been allocated over five years and, since 2014, 17,059 Australians have 
received support (AG DET 2016b; AG DFAT 2016c).  
 The NCP was supplemented in April 2016 by three other initiatives. The National 
Strategy for International Education (NSIE) is Australia’s first national strategy for international 
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education. It sets out a “10-year plan for developing Australia's role as a global leader in 
education, training and research” (NSIE 2016, 1). While the NSIE is led by Australia’s 
Department of Education and Training (DET), its partner national strategy, the Australia 
International Education 2025 Roadmap (AIE2025), seeks to realize the economic potential of 
the international education “market” and is being implemented by Austrade (2016), the 
Australian Government’s trade commission. While these strategies look forward, the Australia 
Global Alumni Engagement Strategy (GAS) looks to Australia’s record in international 
education, seeking to engage the estimated 2.5 million “global alumni community that actively 
engages and promotes Australia and advances its national interests, especially in the Indo-Pacific 
region” (GAS 2016, 10). This third initiative, like the NCP, is led by DFAT. With these four 
major initiatives across three branches of the bureaucracy, Australia’s new international 
education policy is a significant whole-of-government undertaking.  
 In seeking to understand what motivated Australian policy makers in designing this new 
approach, it is important to appreciate that some of the structural drivers of the original Colombo 
plan remain at work. Australia remains a geographically isolated Western state, orientated 
toward an Asian region that is ethnically and politically different. But the Asia of today is far 
larger, stronger, and more independent—in geostrategic, economic, and political terms—than the 
Asia of the 1950s. Australia today sees its regional interests in Asia in terms of the Indian Ocean-
Asia Pacific, or “Indo-Pacific,” stretching as far West as Pakistan (Byrne 2016, 108).  
 If Australia’s relationship with Asia has and will continue to change, so too the modes of 
interaction across individual relationships in international education. It is clear that in developing 
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the international education policy, Australia’s policy makers had people-to-people relationships 
at the forefront of their thinking. In his 2016 interview with the authors, Peter Varghese 
described its more “multi-dimensional engagement with the region” as the most extensive by 
Australia to date: 
It was not enough for Australia to just have strong trading and investment relationships with Asia; 
it's important we’re not seen to be too mercenary about international education, as if we are only 
interested in one thing, which is the international student dollar. We also need to have a 
relationship with the people, societies and communities of the region. 
 
 The leading trade policy official responsible for Austrade’s input echoed the diplomatic 
importance of relationship building over and above commercial concerns during an interview 
with the authors:  
It’s not specifically about creating soft power but it is about saying relationships need to be 
sustained and maintained. There’s always been a view that Australia has been aggressive in the 
international education space and that it's only about economics and commercial interests. So one 
of the big pushes from the sector and the people we consulted in Australia was the need to make 
sure the policy wasn’t purely about making more money. It needed to be about how we would 
contribute back to the greater good as well. 
 
 The way Australia’s new international education policy has been crafted and 
implemented represents a significant change in Australia’s foreign policy approach. Australia’s 
foreign policy establishment had previously viewed cultural and public diplomacy, and notions 
of reputation, identity, and values that are the core currencies of soft power, with some cynicism 
(Byrne and Hall 2013, 423). Julie Bishop’s explicit emphasis on the soft power benefits of 
international education pushes back at that skepticism; according to one academic, not since 
Gareth Evans’ tenure (1988-96) has Australia had a Foreign Minister “so attentive to building 
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Australia’s international reputation, and who designs policies to build support for, engagement 
with, and the attractiveness of Australia's values and international reputation.”8 But to reframe 
international education in this way required a repudiation of three decades of treating education 
purely as an export commodity, a rebranding that explains the revival of the language of the 
Colombo Plan. In its new international education policy, Canberra is seeking to change 
perceptions of an education sector viewed as a source of Australia’s hard economic power, to 
one engaged with affecting how Asia views Australia itself. 
International Education as Soft Power 
 If Australian policy makers are interested in reframing the purpose of international 
education towards building international relationships, how are they going about it? Drawing on 
Vuving’s (2009) typology, this section seeks to assess the balance between “brilliance,” 
“beauty,” and “benignity” that policy makers have sought to strike, and to point to the challenges 
involved in crafting policy where the subject of the policy is determining of its impact.  
“Brilliance” – the Quality of Australian Education  
 It is unsurprising to see Australia emphasize the quality of its higher education sector in 
operationalizing soft power in its education strategy: after all, Australia is behind only the United 
Kingdom and United States in its number of elite universities.9 Yet under closer inspection, 
Australian policy makers’ reference to the “quality” of Australia’s international education is not 
as simple a claim as the requirement for perceptions of “brilliance” might suggest. 
                                                 
8 Michael Wesley, Australian National University, interviewed by the authors on July 26, 2016. 
9 Australia boasts six universities in the top 100 worldwide, according to the QS World University 
Rankings 2016/17.  
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 First of all, Australia’s quality is hamstrung by the global excellence of those two 
competitors, and particularly the United States. While the AIE2025 clearly seeks to increase the 
instance of global excellence within higher education so that it might “become a sector-wide 
culture that we are recognised for” (AIE2025 2016, 7), DFAT official Robert Tranter admits “on 
straight prestige, the UK and USA are still favoured.” This view was shared in DET, where 
Robert Griew, the Associate Secretary responsible, acknowledged in an interview with the 
authors that “the elite will always go to MIT, LSE, and the blue chips.”10 So for one Austrade 
official, while “we know there are a billion learners in the world that need access to quality 
education and training in the next ten years,” the question that will really test Australia’s soft 
power is “how do we get quality education to other places? We want to deliver it in-country.” 
 However, Griew set out a different characterization of quality from simply global 
excellence: “I think Australia is seen as being a really good quality environment, a safe place to 
send your child where the values they’ll be exposed to won’t be too jarring.” In his interview, 
Varghese also pointed to a wider societal vision of “quality associated with lifestyle. So a quality 
degree in an environment which is friendly and easy and welcoming and hopefully one that 
students enjoy.”  
 This reframing of “quality” away from notions of “prestige” or “excellence” and toward 
notions of reliability and safety is critical when considering how the subject in soft power 
operationalization interprets the communication of the agent. But Australian policy makers faced 
particular challenges in crafting a message that might be understood in the desired way both 
                                                 
10 Robert Griew, Associate Secretary, Higher Education, Research and International Education, DET, 
interviewed by the authors on August 3, 2016. 
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abroad and at home. 
 The roots of the messaging around quality in the international education strategy are 
bureaucratic. Within Australia's education system, the word “quality” tends to be used in 
association with regulation and minimum (quality) standards. This is especially the case in public 
policy contexts. When government officials highlight “quality” in education, they are typically 
talking about “quality assurance” as a synonym for “regulation.” This association is apparent in 
the policy documentation—although written to be outward-facing, it had to speak to domestic 
sectoral interests, in particular universities. The NSIE dedicates its first “Pillar” of goals and 
actions to “Strengthening the Fundamentals,” and highlights the setting of nationally consistent 
approaches in government’s policy settings, mandatory transparency of provider information, 
strong quality assurance systems, and strong student protection (NSIE 2016, 13-17). In the 
AIE2025 “Game-changers” section, “maintaining an Australian edge” is linked to “quality 
assurance arrangements” (AIE2025 2016, 11). This inward, bureaucratic focus is striking for its 
failure to proceed from a consideration of the target audience of the strategy: namely, 
international students. Even the appointment of Australia’s first ever Minister for International 
Education was dominated by regulatory language, with Richard Colbeck declaring it “quite 
exciting… to provide effective quality assurance and regulation; that is important in students 
understanding of the quality of the institution that they are going to choose” (Colbeck 2016).  
 Showcasing Australia’s “quality assured” educational offering makes some sense, but it 
is hardly an evocation of “brilliance,” particularly when set against international measures and 
competitors of the calibre of the United States. Relative to nations in the Indo-Pacific, Australia 
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can boast rigorous regulatory arrangements comprising independent standard-setters and 
regulators dedicated to each segment of international education. Other nations have sought to 
learn from Australia’s regulatory framework. Additionally, Australia's international education 
reputation was tainted in the late 2000s by provider closures in the deregulated VET sector that 
left international students unprotected and out of pocket. Other negative accusations around 
student safety, particularly affecting Indian students in 2009, generated claims that Australia was 
potentially unsafe (Chauhan 2009). Australian policy makers have implemented a number of 
regulatory changes over the last five years to correct these issues, and clearly feel it remains 
important that the international community is reassured of this “quality” of Australian education.  
  That policy makers seek to highlight Australia’s educational offering as safe, reliable, and 
somehow culturally unchallenging would intuitively seem to emphasize “benignity” rather than 
“brilliance.” Yet in the language of the policy documentation and reflections of policy makers, 
“quality” is marketed as a feature to be admired, rather than being an “act of kindness” 
producing gratitude and reciprocation, as per Vuving’s (2009) typology. Given this framing, it is 
revealing that this focus was driven more by internal bureaucratic and institutional concerns than 
by an assessment that quality assurance really is what Asian consumers might admire about 
Australian education. It is far from clear how the intended targets of this language are likely to 
understand the use of “quality” when confronted with it in this context.  
 Moreover, a major problem with associating quality with regulation—at least in soft 
power terms—is that the extensive imprint of government may undermine the effectiveness of 
the hidden third face of power. State government official, Rebecca Hall, argued that there is 
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more “government” in Australia's “public diplomacy puzzle” than in any other country.11 Indeed, 
the fragmented and competitive nature of Australia’s education sector may undercut its 
international attractiveness. As Peter Varghese noted in an interview with the authors, “often the 
marketing is very narrow and quite competitive, especially between institutions. In other words, 
‘don’t go there, come here.’ I think that is narrowing for Australia.” Individual states’ marketing 
campaigns play up their own distinctiveness, and a lack of coordination undermines attempts to 
create a single national message. 
 This is a particular challenge in designing policies that will ultimately be judged by the 
subject. Do foreign nationals question the difference between Queensland’s culture, Victoria’s 
culture, and Australia’s culture, or does that sense of fragmentation undercut the “Australian” 
narrative? According to Hall in her interview with the authors, prospective international students 
“don't want to read that you want to take more from another part of your own country. They want 
to read that you're investing in all the right places, that you care for them and that the student 
experience is at the heart of what you do.” At a governance level, the decentralization of the 
education sector in Australia clearly creates issues for national policy makers’ attempts to 
showcase a “brilliant” vision of Australian education. 
  
                                                 
11 Rebecca Hall, Executive Director, International Education and Training Unit, Trade & Investment 
Queensland, interviewed by the authors, July 2016. 
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“Beauty” – Values and the Alumni Experience 
 
All of the feedback we get suggests that Asian middle-class people see Australia as a fairly safe 
cultural environment... there’s a kind of values consonance, a respect for Asian countries and 
some knowledge of them in the Australian classrooms they’ll be in. So there was always a sense 
on the part of the people close to developing and implementing the initiatives that we are 
building on strength, including from the Colombo Plan. We were seeking the resonance of the 
positive experience that generations of parents have had.12 
 
 The Global Alumni Engagement Strategy (GAS 2016) is an explicit attempt to draw on 
this perceived resonance of positive experiences and activate “beauty” as a mechanism of 
attraction. It is premised on the assumption that the 2.5 million foreigners who have studied in 
Australia have overwhelmingly shared a positive experience of their time in the country, and 
subsequently feel a sense of warmth, familiarity, and self-extension with Australia. The GAS 
asserts that alumni identify with Australia and share in its aspirations. It also makes a direct link 
between the affinity generated by their educational experience and their propensity to “give 
back” to Australia: 
Alumni promote Australia's capabilities and expertise. They help us in the broader endeavour to 
lift prosperity and to promote gender equality and other shared values across our region and 
globally... Because of their affinity with Australia, our alumni are active consumers and 
promoters of Australian goods and services in the region and further afield… Alumni contribute 
to Australia's ongoing competitiveness in education, science, research and innovation. They 
reflect positively on the quality of our expertise. They inform, invite and encourage others to 
consider Australian educational institutions and Australia as destinations for study (GAS 2016, 5-
6). 
 
 However, just because there has been an education experience does not guarantee it was a 
                                                 
12 Robert Griew, Associate Secretary, Higher Education, Research and International Education, DET, 
interviewed by the authors, August 2016. 
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good one. In an interview with the authors, Kent Anderson, an academic who has advised policy 
makers on international education, worried that “there is a perception in government that one of 
the benefits of international education is that everyone who studies here is going to love us. Look 
at the cabinet in Indonesia, half of them were trained here.” Anderson is skeptical of an overly 
simplistic logic that supports alumni policies, “that all the people that come over here will then 
be soft power proponents.”13 Peter Varghese’s views appear to reflect the substance of Professor 
Anderson’s critique: “It’s always been my view that the best advertisement for Australia is 
Australia itself” —although he introduces some qualification—“In other words, the more people 
that can directly know Australia, the better, because on balance I’m confident they will come 
away with a positive view of Australia.”14 
 What that balance is exactly remains an open question—a strategy in international 
education that relies on Australia’s warm weather and good beaches hardly makes the case for 
education being a source of soft power. That said, there is some support in the literature for 
recognizing the importance of the personal and community connections that surround student 
exchanges—what David Lowe (2015) describes as the “vernacular internationalism,” or 
international students encountering ordinary Australians. But even where student experiences 
have been educationally positive (as well as socially and culturally positive), that does not 
necessarily mean that the relationships formed have been imbued with the necessary depth for 
alumni contributions, let alone soft power generating behaviors. Moreover, educational 
                                                 
13 Kent Anderson, University of Western Australia and NCP Advisory Committee member, interviewed 
by the authors on July 5, 2016. 
14 Interviewed by the authors. Emphasis added. 
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institutions—and particularly elite higher education institutions—are highly global in character, 
and so easily denationalized. For Anderson, significantly more “tribalism” is required: 
…the idea that because I studied in Australia, a PhD in plant biology at the University of Western 
Australia, say, I somehow have some connection with another person from my country who's 
done a 6-month study abroad at Southern Queensland University... I just don't think there's any 
connection there… What you want with alumni, you want a bit of tribalism… a bit of shared 
experience that then leads to shared activities. I think the idea of doing that across an entire 
nation, particularly one as big as Australia with as many international students as Australia, is just 
insane. 
  
Diplomats are more positive about the prospects for alumni connections, at least at the 
level of shared values. Peter Varghese views constructive and active engagement within the 
multilateral system more broadly as enabling Australia to project a positive image of itself and 
maintain a visibility which can reinforce the value-affinity it is trying to leverage through the 
GAS. Australia aims to be “perceived as constructive, open-minded, and a generator of ideas. 
Then your ability to get what you want from the multilateral system is enhanced. Whereas if you 
are seen as inward looking, difficult, and too narrow in your focus then you are a much less 
effective, multilateral player.”  
 Yet while contributions to the values of international institutions can be viewed as acts of 
“beauty,” throughout its history, Australia has had an uncomfortable relationship with its own 
values and ideals. In particular, Australia has long struggled with contradictory positions on race 
and equality. These have been evident in opposing portfolio interests and incompatible policies 
at the nexus of the trade, aid, and immigration portfolios, all of which have profoundly affected 
international education. Many across Asia are aware of Australia’s contradictory domestic 
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governance. In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, Australia struggled to explain how its highly restrictive 
immigration policy under an overt “White Australia Policy” did not contradict the values it 
argued it demonstrated through the Colombo Plan, of openness, generosity, hospitality, and 
acceptance of diversity (Oakman 2004). 
  The situation today exhibits some similarities. Contrast an international education policy 
that highlights Australian values—“open, contemporary and innovative” (GAS 2016, 6) and 
“tolerant, outward looking and free” (Bishop 2015) with the country’s restrictive immigration 
policies, particularly toward asylum seekers. Australia’s asylum policy—with its “warehousing” 
of asylum seekers at offshore detention centers and commitment to “turn back the boats”—was 
branded a “disgrace” by the Guardian newspaper (Guardian 2016); Human Rights Watch 
condemned the policies as causing “severe and lasting harm” (Westbrook 2017); and Asian 
newspapers ran highly critical comment pieces (Power 2016). Such policies—and the perception 
of them—sit uncomfortably with Australia’s education marketing and its claims of “openness” 
and “tolerance.” 
 Wider aspects of Australia’s domestic politics may also threaten the credible projection 
of such liberal values. When Pauline Hanson, representing a “One Nation” party, first rose to 
prominence, concern was expressed across Asia after she campaigned on a ‘racist’ anti-Asian 
platform, claiming that “we are in danger of being swamped by Asians” and seeking to abolish 
multiculturalism (Bolt 1996). In 2016, Hanson was elected to the Australian senate together with 
three other One Nation party representatives, complete with a proposal to ban Muslim 
immigration into Australia. A number of Australian universities have expressed concern to DET 
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officials about the potential effect on international student numbers, in a context of disquiet 
conveyed by Indo-Pacific governments around what the election result says about Australians’ 
views and values more broadly. For all that—on balance—Australia may be a tolerant and open 
society, the soft power associated with those values is heavily dependent on perception. Beauty 
is an affinity that is difficult to cultivate, even given alumni experiences. It may erode over 
distance and over time, and is disproportionately easy to undermine. 
“Benignity”—“We need to spend more time with each other” 
 Speaking to students at Hasanuddin University in Indonesia in March 2016, Julie Bishop 
struck a humble and empathetic tone. “We need to spend more time with each other. We need to 
understand each other. We need to talk more often. We need to stand in each other's shoes and 
see the world from each other’s perspectives.” The headline aim of the NCP is “to lift knowledge 
of the Indo-Pacific in Australia” by supporting Australian undergraduates to study and undertake 
internships in the region (AG DFAT 2016b). The need to “lift knowledge of the Indo-Pacific” is 
as close as any government is likely to get to publicly acknowledging that its nationals are 
ignorant of their closest neighbors.  
 The principle behind the NCP is that knowledge and empathy is a prerequisite for soft 
power. For Kent Anderson, who advises on the implementation of the NCP, the program is a 
direct response to the widely held view that Australians do not know enough about the Indo-
Pacific region, a region to which they are increasingly reliant. Student mobility has, to date, been 
“one way,” with mobile Australian students typically choosing Anglophone universities in 
America and Europe over Asian universities, while thousands of Asians come to study in 
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Australia each year. 
 There is deep potential goodwill in an approach that says, “we don’t know enough about 
you and so we will invest our resources ($AUD 100 million+) in coming to you and spending 
time having a lived experience according to your way of life.” Policy makers repeatedly noted in 
interviews the importance of Australians experiencing other cultures, particularly Asian cultures 
in the region where Australia sees its future. Correcting the huge disparity in numbers between 
Asian international students in Australia compared to Australians in Asia is a key driver of the 
NCP. In principle, such benignity may produce gratitude and reciprocal altruism, a condition 
confirmed by the observations of Australia’s head diplomat Peter Varghese in an interview with 
the authors:  
I have been to several meetings, at the highest levels, just after the New Colombo Plan was 
announced and the way in which it was picked up, endorsed and embraced was really quite 
striking. I think there’s something that the region found quite touching about making this a two-
way traffic. They all understand why Australia is interested in attracting students but the idea that 
we would encourage Australians, as a “rite of passage”, in the way that Julie Bishop used to 
describe it, to spend some time in the region over the course of their undergraduate degree, they 
found a mark of respect for their country. And many of them were quite taken aback and 
impressed by it. 
 
 Varghese may be over-optimistic in his judgment of the likely success of the NCP in 
terms of soft power. “AsiaBound,” a precursor to the NCP, was established in 2012 under the 
former Labour Government. This program sponsored Australian students to do a semester in an 
Asian university, just as the NCP does. Kent Anderson, a member of the NCP Advisory 
Committee and former Chair of the AsiaBound Advisory Board, asserted to the authors that “the 
programs are identical.” Yet it barely had any impact. Despite more money having been spent 
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publicizing AsiaBound than the NCP, he said, “I bet if you said “AsiaBound” right now, there 
wouldn't be more than five people in the entire country who would know what you were talking 
about.” 
 The difference in traction may well be one of framing—according to Robert Griew, one 
of AsiaBound’s architects, the program was almost called “the new Colombo Plan.” However, it 
is also an issue of proper spotlighting. Each time Foreign Minister Bishop speaks to NCP 
audiences, she reflects that the NCP got its inspiration from the original Colombo Plan, which 
she continuously asserts was hugely successful. But at the same time, the resourcing and 
attention given to the NCP in the political bureaucracy has mostly reinforced the benign image of 
genuine cooperation sought. The rapid implementation of the program helped to reinforce the 
message that Asia is important to Australia, but of the 17,000 Australians to have studied in the 
region by 2017, a not-insignificant proportion will have spent less than a month there, a period of 
time that may be insufficient to form lasting relationships, or really come to understand the 
cultures to which they are so fleetingly exposed. 
 A range of structural “machinery of government” changes made when the Liberal 
Government came to power had the explicit purpose of “putting more of a public diplomacy 
framework around educational exchange,” according to our interview with Robert Tranter. This 
involved “thinking about how we are harnessing the soft power potential and seeing educational 
exchange as part of a narrative of Australia's engagement with the world.” Outbound mobility 
policy, scholarships, and the former AusAID were consolidated in DFAT, and a new Division 
for Public Diplomacy, Communications, and Scholarship was established. For Anderson, the fact 
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that the NCP is the “in the Department of Foreign Affairs, not in the Department of Education” 
explicitly reinforces its soft, diplomatic purpose. 
 Alongside this, student mobility administration was consolidated in DET. For Robert 
Griew, the official with responsibility for international education at DET: 
 the fact the NCP was being done at a diplomatic level as well as through education, really did 
seem to push it along... DFAT did what they're good at, which was opening doors and unsnagging 
things like internship visa arrangements. We (DET) did the heavy lifting. We did all the 
administration and the relationships with the universities.  
 
 Yet despite effective departmental collaboration, broader Australian Government 
Administration may be hindering relationship-building attempts. According to Griew, “domestic 
portfolios in the Australian government don’t have a sense of having a relationship to domestic 
portfolios in neighbouring countries.” The official did not travel overseas once between the 
election of the Liberal Party in September 2013 and his departure from the department in July 
2015—the prime implementation period of the NCP. Nonetheless, the government's overall 
reprioritization of outbound mobility has had an effect at the institutional level. According to 
Rebecca Hall, within 12 months of the Liberal Party winning government, “student and 
academic mobility had become a strategic conversation between Vice Chancellors, a new 
currency in terms of how well they are performing.” 
 Another governance feature supporting the benignity of NCP has been a genuinely 
highly-engaged, and seemingly personally-invested, Foreign Minister. Interviewees for this 
paper consistently remarked that the deeper policy engagement by DFAT and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs herself explained a greater prioritization of soft diplomacy within international 
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education policies. Julie Bishop’s previous role as the Minister for Education not only explains 
that level of engagement, but also gives her credibility in pursuing soft power through 
international education. As Kent Anderson summarizes, “It’s really hard to find any other 
Foreign Minister anywhere in the world who is championing this cause in the way that Julie 
Bishop does and in the way that she has.” 
Conclusion 
 Australia’s new international education policy provides the opportunity to assess the 
deliberate operationalization of soft power in a real-world setting, carried out by policy makers 
who were cognizant of the challenges of the undertaking. It is clear that both politicians and 
officials sought to design a policy in international education that would serve the diplomatic 
interests of Australia. In doing so, they considered the components of Australia's attractiveness in 
a multidimensional way, consciously seeking to activate perceptions of “benignity” and 
“beauty,” primarily through the NCP and GAS, respectively. These are new dimensions for 
Australia's international education as a diplomatic instrument, reflecting a more sophisticated 
approach than simply the promotion of the “quality” of the sector (“brilliance”).  
 There is certainly a boldness to the design of these policies in support of soft power, 
and—among officials at least—a confidence in their likely impact. Yet domestic bureaucratic 
obstacles hampered a significantly subject-focused approach, particularly in the framing of the 
“quality” of Australian education, where the policy reflects the language of domestic 
bureaucracy, rather than being focused on the target audience. Moreover, how these efforts will 
be received is unclear, and for the level of resources being committed soft power remains a risky 
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bet. Will Australia’s international education strategy change perceptions of Australia, or make a 
contribution to bringing other states’ diplomatic preferences in line with Australia's national 
interests? Further analysis will be required across multiple country case studies to understand 
subject responses, and it is unclear whether good research design can isolate soft power’s impact. 
 A key conceptual issue remains. Skepticism abounds about whether governments—in 
international education or any other sector—can be effective agents of soft power activity. As 
Gary Rawnsley, Professor of Public Diplomacy at Aberystwyth University, told the UK House 
of Lords, “[i]f there is any suspicion about the motivations or method of exercising soft power, 
any potential benefits are lost” (UK House of Lords 2014). In seeking to cultivate soft power, at 
least in international education, Australia is assuming that this risk will not transpire in Asia, and 
is hedging against another risk: that with nations around the world all competing for soft power 
in the region, it is those that aren’t prepared to play the game that will ultimately lose out. 
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